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Risk disclosure, international orientation, and share price 
informativeness: Evidence from China 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the effect of textual risk disclosure on the amount of 
firm-specific information incorporated into share prices, as measured by stock price 
synchronicity, for Chinese listed firms during 2007-2011. We find that synchronicity 
is inversely associated with risk disclosure, suggesting that risk disclosure is firm 
specific and useful to investors. In addition, our results document that the usefulness 
of risk information is statistically and economically more pronounced among 
internationally oriented firms than their domestically oriented peers, consistent with 
the necessity for risk disclosure to be more meaningful when it relates to greater 
uncertainty. Finally, we find that internationally oriented firms tend to disclose more 
risk factors than their domestically oriented counterparts. Our findings are robust to a 
variety of specifications and the use of alternative measures of risk disclosure, stock 
price synchronicity and international orientation. Our paper has practical implications 
since its findings shed light on the current debate on whether or not narrative sections 
of annual reports convey useful information to investors. 
 
Keywords: Risk disclosure; stock price synchronicity; international orientation; China 
 
JEL Classification: D8; G24; G12; M4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
1. Introduction 
    Considerable attention has been paid recently to risk-related disclosure. Such 
attention is even greater during difficult times such as corporate scandals (e.g., Enron, 
WorldCom, American Insurance Group, and Lehman Brothers) and economic crises 
(e.g., 2007-2008’s financial crisis). In such circumstances, the question of whether 
accounting is functioning effectively by providing the public with relevant 
information becomes increasingly crucial and, as a result, more pressure is put on 
professional bodies by the regulators (e.g., Barth and Landsman, 2010). For instance, 
in the US in 1997, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) published 
Financial Reporting Release (FRR) No. 48 on the market risk of financial instruments, 
mandating the presentation of both qualitative and quantitative market risk 
information.
1
 Similarly, sections 302 and 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act (2002) 
obligate firms to provide information about their significant risks, derivatives, and 
hedging activities. Since the release of these two documents, the literature on risk 
disclosure has been dominated by empirical examinations of the extent to which US 
firms convey useful risk information based on the contents of FRR (48) (e.g., Rajgopal, 
1999; Hodder and McAnally, 2001; Jorion, 2002; Linsmeier et al., 2002; Kravet and 
Muslu, 2013; Campbell et al., 2014). 
Unlike the US mandatory approach towards risk disclosure, the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) encourages all Chinese listed companies to discuss 
risk factors in their annual reports, “following the principle of importance and 
disclosing major risks that may have an adverse impact on the realization of the firm’s 
development strategies and business objectives in the next year” (CSRC [2005] No. 
141). However, this framework only provides a guideline on risk reporting and the 
final decisions over the form and contents of their disclosure are left to the firms.  
Arguably, two competing motives underpin managers’ decisions to either 
withhold or reveal meaningful information (Beyer et al., 2010). Specifically, with 
regard to risk disclosure in the Chinese context, the voluntary nature of the CSRC’s 
                                                        
1
 FRR (48) deals with the market risk of derivatives, and provides three formats for quantitative 
disclosure: sensitivity analysis, value at risk and tabular formats. These three formats should provide 
the impacts of any changes in the market rate and prices on cash flow, earnings and fair value. 
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requirements allows management discretion over what risk information to disclose. 
Firms’ managers might have disincentives to disclose risk as doing so might draw the 
market’s attention to the firm’s riskiness (e.g., Elshandidiy et al., 2013) or increase 
investors’ perceptions of risk, causing them to increase their risk premium to 
compensate for the high risk exposure (e.g., Kravet and Muslu, 2013; Campbell et al., 
2014). To avoid the potential deterioration in the market value of such firms, 
managers might therefore withhold risk information or minimize its usefulness. 
Furthermore, given the fact that the Chinese market has relatively low information 
transparency and poor investor protection (e.g., La Porta et al., 1998), investors have 
reasons to doubt the reliability and usefulness of the risk factors disclosed by Chinese 
listed firms. 
On the contrary, investors need useful risk information as it provides direct 
information on a firm’s risk profile, which may in turn affect investors’ assessments of 
expected cash flows (Miihkinen, 2013). Providing risk information might reduce 
investors’ uncertainty related to future cash flows, which reduces, as a result, their risk 
premiums (e.g., Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter, 2003; Elshandidy and Neri, 2015). 
Decreased risk premiums lead to a lower required rate of return, which is widely used 
in practice as a discount factor for investors’ future cash flows. Thus, firm managers 
might have incentives to disclose more meaningful information to their investors.   
To obtain a better understanding of the information content of China’s corporate 
reporting, especially narrative reporting, the Association of Chartered Certified 
Accountants (ACCA) and the Shanghai Stock Exchange jointly conducted a survey in 
2010. The results suggested that 82% of the respondents considered disclosed risk 
factors to be important in decision making (ACCA, 2011a). However, the empirical 
evidence on whether risk disclosure is informative in the context of China remains 
quite unclear, thus far, since there is little, if any, research investigating explicitly 
whether firms within the Chinese market provide proper risk disclosure, to an extent 
whereby investors can rely on it to better understand the firms’ risks and uncertainties. 
Exploring whether risk disclosure is credible within one of the largest and 
fastest-growing economies in the world is becoming increasingly vital. This is 
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especially true given the fact that the Chinese context is quite unique (e.g., the 
approach towards risk disclosure relies largely on encouraging rather than requiring 
firms to reveal risk information and investor protection is generally weak), differing 
from other contexts where the usefulness of risk disclosure has been tested recently 
(e.g., Kravet and Muslu, 2013; Campbell et al., 2014). Making generalizations, 
therefore, based on extant evidence on the usefulness of risk disclosure might go 
against a strong strand of literature that argues that accounting practices 
(measurements and disclosures) within a specific context (such as China) should 
reflect its underlying environmental factors (e.g., Nobes, 1998; Dober et al., 2011). 
Using a unique dataset that measures the extent of the risk disclosure of Chinese 
listed firms during the period 2007-2011, this paper examines the effect of risk 
disclosure on the amount of firm-specific information incorporated into share prices, 
as measured by stock price synchronicity. Moreover, we investigate whether the 
association varies between firms with different levels of risks. Prior research 
demonstrates that firms possessing greater risks tend to disclose more risk (e.g., 
Dobler et al., 2011; Elshandidy el al., 2013; Campbell et al., 2014; Elshandidy et al., 
2015). Stock market regulators around the world also encourage firms to disclose 
more meaningful risk factors to respond to market-wide fluctuations (Jorgensen and 
Kirschenheiter, 2003). Our paper pays special attention to the risk information 
disclosed by Chinese firms that are broadly classified as internationally oriented on 
the basis of their foreign sales, for the following reasons. First, internationalization is 
inherently risky due to increased exposure to various risk factors (e.g., currency and 
political risks), which in turn increases information asymmetry between management 
and information users such as analysts and investors (Duru and Reeb, 2002). Second, 
China did not become a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) until 
December 2001. Through rapid development, China surpassed the U.S to become the 
world’s largest trading nation in 2012 as measured by the sum of exports and imports 
of goods.
2
 Consequently, it is imperative for policy makers, firms and investors to 
                                                        
2 See the link:  
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-02-09/china-passes-u-s-to-become-the-world-s-biggest-
trading-nation  
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consider the risk-reporting practice in such an export-oriented economy.  
Our results suggest that risk disclosure is inversely associated with stock price 
synchronicity, suggesting that such disclosure is not boilerplate but instead conveys 
useful information to investors.
3
 We find also that the negative association between 
risk disclosure and stock price synchronicity is more pronounced among 
internationally oriented firms (IOFs) than domestically oriented firms (DOFs), 
consistent with risk disclosure being more meaningful when it relates to greater 
uncertainty. These results explain why, as confirmed by additional analysis, IOFs, in 
the first place, have greater incentives to exhibit more risk factors in their narrative 
sections than do DOFs. Overall, our evidence is in line with the argument that firms’ 
exposure to risk affects their choice of risk disclosure contents because investors 
demand more risk information from riskier firms (Lin et al., 2010). All of our findings 
are robust to a variety of sensitivity tests and alternative proxies for risk disclosure, 
stock price synchronicity and international orientation.  
Our study contributes to the extant literature in several ways. First, risk disclosure 
has been studied regularly in the context of western economies such as the US 
(Kravet and Muslu, 2013; Campbell et al., 2014). However, it remains unclear whether 
risk disclosure is informative in emerging economies such as China, despite that 
country’s increasingly important economic position in the world. To our best 
knowledge, our study is the first to provide direct evidence on the informativeness of 
risk disclosure in China. Our results help regulatory bodies and investors generally, 
and corporate disclosure users in particular, to better understand the extent to which, 
and in what manner, risk disclosure influences firm-specific information capitalization 
in an environment where overall country-level investor protection is relatively poor. 
Second, methodologically, our study differs from prior studies in that we measure 
informativeness using the amount of firm-specific information incorporated into stock 
prices, rather than regularly used measures such as stock return volatility, trading 
volume, bid-ask spread, and analyst forecast dispersion (Kravet and Muslu, 2013; 
                                                        
3
 Boilerplate is taken to mean that firms might engage in some forms of risk disclosure where they 
either will not be useful or less useful to investors. Firms might engage in such forms just to comply 
with regulations that might require filling some forms such as form 10-K. 
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Miihkinen, 2013; Campbell et al., 2014). Gul et al. (2010) provide supportive 
evidence of the validity of stock price synchronicity as a measure of informativeness 
in the Chinese stock market.
4
 Lastly, our study contributes to the literature on 
international finance since there is little, if any, evidence on how international 
orientation affects the informativeness of the risk disclosure of Chinese firms. Our 
paper supports the idea that international diversification facilitates the flow of 
firm-specific risk information into the market. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides 
institutional background and the literature review. Section 3 develops our research 
hypotheses. Section 4 explains the research design, including the measurement of the 
variables, model specification, sample selection and data sources. Section 5 reports 
the results of the main analyses, followed by the results of robustness checks and 
additional analysis in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Institutional background and literature review 
2.1 Institutional background 
    In the early 1990s, China opened two stock exchanges on the mainland, 
Shanghai and Shenzhen, to facilitate economic development by allowing firms to 
acquire external equity capital. Since its establishment, China’s stock market has 
undergone substantial growth along with the country’s economy. In terms of market 
capitalization, China’s stock market had become the largest of any developing country 
by 2001 and is now the second largest in the world, behind the US. The Chinese stock 
market is characterized by a lack of transparency and an underdeveloped legal 
framework. More recently, numerous efforts have been launched by the CSRC to 
better regulate the stock market (Cheung et al., 2010). Glaeser et al. (2001) suggest 
that regulators can provide an effective substitute for ineffective judicial enforcement, 
particularly in emerging economies with relatively weak legal systems.  
The primary objective of the corporate disclosure regulatory framework in China 
                                                        
4
 They find a weaker return-earnings association for firms with high synchronicity, because that 
earnings are considered the most important value-relevant firm-specific information.  
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is to improve the efficiency of the Chinese stock markets and protect investors’ 
interests (CSRC, 1996). Since 1993, a growing number of disclosure rules and 
requirements have emerged in China. One of the landmark events was the issuance of 
Detailed Rules for the Implementation of Information Disclosure by Publicly Listed 
Firms in 1993. In 1994, the CSRC further released the Rules on the Contents and 
Formats of Listed Firms’ Annual Reports, which was the first regulation aimed 
specifically at addressing such aspects for Chinese listed firms. A series of revisions 
have been made since then, substantially increasing the information that listed firms 
should disclose to the market. 
Corporate risk reporting has received increasing regulatory attention in China 
since 2002, when listed firms were encouraged to disclose information about 
uncertainties in their operations for the first time. However, the requirements on risk 
disclosure did not become more detailed until 2005. Specifically, CSRC [2005] No. 
141 requires sufficient disclosure of major risks by companies, including political, 
operational, financial and technology risks, as well as the measures that have been or 
will be taken to tackle the risks. In 2012, the CSRC further revised the Rules on the 
Contents and Formats of Listed Firms’ Annual Reports (CSRC [2012] No. 22), 
classifying risk factors into more specific subcategories such as the risk of failure of 
sustainable growth in the future, that of the failure of sustainable technical innovation 
or product updating, the risk of product market competition, of reliance on large 
clients, of major investment failure, of key technician loss and so forth. These rules as 
a whole reflect the intent of the Chinese stock market regulators to strengthen the 
pertinence and effectiveness of the information disclosed by listed firms.
5
 
 
2.2 Literature review on risk disclosure 
    Two main streams can be distinguished with regard to the current trend for risk 
disclosure. While the first stream concerns the question of why firms might provide 
risk information in the narrative sections of their annual reports, the second stream 
                                                        
5
 In the present paper, our scoring criteria are based on the 2005 regulatory framework because our 
sample covers the period of 2007-2011. 
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complements the first by examining the extent to which the disclosed risk information 
is informative. 
The first stream represents the principal trend of research in Europe generally 
(e.g., see Berretta and Bozzolan, 2004 regarding Italy; Miihkinen, 2012 regarding 
Finland) and the UK particularly (e.g., Marshall and Weetman, 2002, 2007; Linsley 
and Shrives, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Elshandidy et al., 2013; Abraham and 
Shrives, 2013). Those studies highlight factors that influence managers’ decisions 
over the quantity (Marshall and Weetman 2002, 2007; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; 
Abraham and Cox, 2007; Elshandidy et al., 2013 and 2015) and/or the quality 
(Berretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Miihkinen, 2012; Abraham and Shrives, 2013) of risk 
disclosure. All previous research has conducted manual content analysis (with the 
exception of Elshandidy et al’s (2013) automated method) to measure risk disclosure 
levels. Additionally, those studies’ contexts were mainly restricted within a single 
country, with the exception of Dobler et al. (2011) who observed variations in the 
level of risk disclosure across Canada, Germany, the UK and the US. 
The second stream is extensively representative of the principal trend in research 
on risk disclosure in the US. Early research in this stream (e.g., Rajgopal, 1999; 
Hodder and McAnally, 2001; Jorion, 2002; Linsmeier et al., 2002; Kravet and Muslu, 
2013; Campbell et al., 2014) is motivated by FRR (48) regarding market risk. 
Rajgopal (1999) examines the usefulness of the SEC’s requirements and finds a 
significant association between these requirements and both stock returns and share 
price sensitivity. He finds, however, incomparability of derivative market risk 
reporting between the three required formats. To overcome this weakness, Hodder and 
McAnally (2001) propose a methodology to convert information from the tabular 
format into the other two formats, suggesting that the tabular format is effective in 
providing useful information about firms’ derivative market risk. Nevertheless, 
Linsmeier et al. (2002) and Jorion (2002) point out that value at risk measures are 
informative since this type of disclosure enables investors to predict variability in 
trading revenues and make adequate comparisons of trading portfolios. Instead of 
measuring the amount and/or quality of risk disclosure under FRR (48), previous 
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studies indirectly measure the impact of risk disclosure by observing the impact of the 
new rules of FRR (48) on the market indicators around the filing dates of form 10-K. 
Contrary to previous research, the most recent literature on textual disclosure 
(Kravet and Muslu, 2013; Campbell et al., 2014) applies a direct measure of risk 
disclosure so as to observe its impact on the market indicators (market liquidity and 
investor-perceived risk). For instance, Campbell et al. (2014) find that, while risk 
factor disclosure increases firms’ riskiness, it decreases the information gap between 
insiders (management) and outsiders (shareholders). Consistent with these findings, 
Kravet and Muslu (2013) find that risk disclosure is likely to increase investors’ risk 
perceptions. Their further investigation suggests that firm-level risk disclosure is more 
likely to be boilerplate. 
 
2. 3 Literature review on stock price synchronicity 
    A commonly used proxy for stock price synchronicity is the R
2
 statistic 
estimated from the market model. A high R
2
 indicates a high level of stock price 
synchronicity, that is, less firm-specific information incorporated into stock prices. In 
his seminal work, Ross (1988) argues that the extent to which stock prices move 
together depends on the relative amounts of firm-specific and market-specific 
information capture in stock prices (Morck et al., 2000). Using a sample of US firms, 
Ross finds that market-wide information explains only a small portion (e.g., 
20%-35%) of stock price movements. In addition, Morck et al. (2000) find that stock 
prices are less synchronous in economies in which private property rights are better 
protected. Their interpretation is that strong property rights protection encourages 
informed trading, which facilitates the inclusion of firm-specific information in stock 
prices, leading to lower synchronicity. 
A related issue is whether firm-specific stock price movements are associated 
with the incorporation of private information or noise trading, which tends to decrease 
stock price synchronicity. Durnev et al. (2003) examine the relation between stock 
price synchronicity and various accounting measures of stock price informativeness, 
i.e., the ability of the share price to anticipate future earnings. They find that stock 
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price synchronicity is negatively correlated with future earnings response coefficient 
and earnings incremental explanatory power, lending support to the argument that 
stock price synchronicity is related to the flow of firm-specific information. Based on 
these findings, several follow-up studies use stock price synchronicity as a measure of 
price informativeness and examine its association with analyst activity (Piotroski and 
Roulstone, 2004; Chan and Hameed, 2006), ownership structure (Boubaker et al., 
2014), efficient capital allocation (Wurgler, 2000), corporate transparency (Jin and 
Myers, 2006), voluntary disclosure (Haggard et al., 2008), earnings management 
(Hutton et al., 2009), audit quality (Gul et al., 2010) and the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (Kim and Shi, 2012). 
 
3. Hypothesis development 
3.1 Risk disclosure and share price informativeness 
    Information asymmetry occurs when investors possess private information about 
a firm’s value, which subsequently creates an adverse selection problem in the market 
as the informed investors may trade based on their private information (Brown and 
Hillegeist, 2007). To mitigate the information problem and facilitate the efficient 
allocation of resources in the capital market, previous studies have consistently 
emphasized the important role of firm disclosure in decreasing the information risk 
facing investors (e.g., Lev, 1988; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Easley and O’Hara, 
2004). Most of these studies focus on the economic consequences of accounting 
information and forward-looking disclosure. However, given the unique feature of 
risk disclosure in that it might be perceived as a bad signal by investors, prior 
literature has yielded mixed findings on its informativeness.   
Risk disclosure could be informative and useful for investors for three main 
reasons. First, risk disclosure provides direct information on a firm’s risk profile, 
which may in turn affect investors’ assessments of expected cash flows as well as the 
discount rates they use in their valuation models (Miihkinen, 2013). Second, risk 
disclosure alleviates information asymmetry by lowering the risk of the adverse 
selection problem. Despite being intrinsically forward-looking, risk disclosure differs 
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from other forward-looking information in that it guides users about the range rather 
than the level of a firm’s future performance (Kravet and Muslu, 2013). In that sense, 
risk disclosure increases the amount of information available on a firm’s risk and 
changes investors’ risk perceptions (Kim and Verrecchia, 1994). Third, risk disclosure 
is typically related to unfavorable conditions and uncertainty about a firm’s future 
performance (Kim and Yasuda, 2013). Since investors’ distaste for risk information 
affects asset prices beyond the traditional risk factors (Barry and Brown, 1985; 
Caskey, 2009), learning about a firm’s exposure to risk factors may mitigate the 
concerns of investors and enable them to reassess the firm’s value. In addition, 
Kothari et al. (2009) suggest that the market places a heavier weight on bad news than 
good news, because management has an incentive to skew disclosure towards better 
news. 
However, as suggested by prior literature, risk disclosure could also fail to be 
informative for investors for the following reasons. First, risk disclosure is mainly 
composed of qualitative descriptions of risk exposures (Schipper, 2007). Compared to 
quantitative information, qualitative might be more difficult to take into account in 
valuations as it fails to provide any direct figures (Miihkinen, 2013). Second, firms 
are likely to make boilerplate risk statements simply to conform to regulations. This is 
particularly the case in emerging countries with underdeveloped institutional 
frameworks, such as China. In addition, many firms may repeat their risk factors over 
consecutive annual reports, further reducing their informativeness (Kim and Yasuda, 
2013). Finally, managers tend to withhold risky information because revealing it may 
reduce a firm’s market value (Verrecchia, 2001). Alternatively, managers may be 
selective over risk disclosure by focusing on known risk factors that have already 
been perceived by investors and thus are less likely to affect investors’ risk 
perceptions than unknown risk factors (e.g., Kravet and Muslu, 2013).  
Our discussions above suggest that risk disclosure exerts two potentially 
offsetting influences on share price informativeness. As long as the opposing effects 
do not cancel each other out perfectly, then there should be an empirically observable 
risk disclosure effect. Thus, we hypothesize that: 
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H1: Risk disclosure in the narrative sections of annual reports is likely to influence 
significantly the observed share price informativeness.   
 
3.2 International orientation and the informativeness of risk disclosures 
    Prior literature suggests that foreign operations are inherently uncertain and risky 
(e.g., Madura, 1992; Bodnar and Weintrop, 1997; Knight and Kim, 2009).
6
 Reeb et al. 
(1998) find a significant positive relationship between the level of systematic risk and 
the degree of internationalization of a firm. In addition, they identify a set of risks 
associated with international business, including foreign exchange risk, political risk, 
the agency problem, asymmetric information, and managers’ self-fulfilling beliefs. 
Their argument has been corroborated by a number of studies using archival data (e.g., 
He and Ng, 1998; Thomas, 2000; Duru and Reeb, 2002; Olibe et al., 2008). For 
example, Thomas (2000) suggests that foreign earnings are underpriced by the market, 
possibly due to the considerable uncertainty facing investors assessing firm value. 
Duru and Reeb (2002) find that analyst forecast accuracy and unbiasedness decline 
with corporate international diversification. Their interpretation is that 
internationalization yields greater complexity, which stems from the greater volatility 
of foreign earnings relative to that of domestic earnings. Additionally, managers have 
more discretion as a firm increases its operations abroad, leading to higher 
information asymmetry between analysts and management. In order to alleviate 
information asymmetry, investors may require more firm-specific risk information 
from firms that are perceived as risky. Thus, we predict the association between risk 
disclosure and price informativeness to be significantly greater among IOFs than their 
domestically oriented peers. We test the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: The impact of risk disclosure on share price informativeness is more pronounced 
among internationally oriented firms. 
 
                                                        
6
 We also note that some of the international finance literature posits the idea that international 
business decreases systematic risks owing to diversification benefits (Shapiro, 1978; Michel and 
Shaked, 1986). However, a growing number of recent studies have provided evidence inconsistent with 
this argument. 
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4. Research design 
4.1 Measurement of key variables 
4.1.1 Share price informativeness 
Our measure of price informativeness is stock price synchronicity. Theoretically 
speaking, the stock price of a firm conveys less firm-specific information if its stock 
return is strongly correlated with the market return. Following prior literature (e.g., 
Morck et al., 2000; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004; Gul et al., 2010), we first estimate 
the market model by regressing individual returns on market and industry returns: 
    R E T M K T R E T M K T R E T I N D R E T I N D R E Tt t0 1 2 t 1 3 4 t 1i,t i,t        
(1) 
where, for firm i and time t, RET denotes the firm-specific return on A-shares traded 
on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, and MKTRET and INDRET denote 
the value-weighted A-share market and industry returns, respectively. To control for 
autocorrelations possibly caused by thin trading, the lagged market and industry 
returns are also included in the model. 
In Eq. (1) we only take the systematic return of the Chinese stock markets into 
consideration. However, Chinese stock returns may also be influenced by market 
factors outside of China (Gul et al., 2010). Specifically, prior studies (e.g., Ding and 
Cheng, 2011; Ding et al., 2013) suggest that the US market leads the movements in 
the Chinese market. To address this issue, we also estimate a two-factor market model 
incorporating the returns of both the Chinese and US markets:  
RET MKTRET USRETt t0 1 2i,t i,t
                                 (2) 
where USRET is the weighted-average return on all US stocks, and the other variables 
are defined as earlier. Eqs (1) and (2) are estimated based on daily returns over the 30 
trading days following the risk disclosure release dates. Given the length of annual 
reports, it is reasonable to assume that investors may not be able to update their 
assessments of firm value promptly (Kravet and Muslu, 2013). Thus, we use a 
medium-length testing period to allow time for the investors and financial analysts to 
interpret the risk disclosure information and react based on their interpretations. As in 
prior studies, stock price synchronicity is defined as the ratio of firm-specific return 
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variation to total return variation, which is essentially equal to 1-R
2
i,t in the market 
models we estimate. Since R
2
 is bounded within [0, 1], we use a logarithmic 
transformation of R
2
 as follows: 
2
R
i,t
SYNCH log( )
i,t 2
1 R
i,t


                                          (3)  
where R
2
i,t is the goodness-of-fit measure from the estimation of one or other of our 
market models for firm i and year t. As SYNCH is a monotonically increasing function 
of R
2
, a higher value of SYNCH will indicate a higher correlation between the firm 
and the market, suggesting that the stock price contains less firm-specific information. 
In our empirical analyses, we obtain two alternative measures of SYNCH: one 
estimated using the R
2
 from Eq. (1), denoted by SYNCH(1), and the other using the R
2
 
from Eq. (2), denoted by SYNCH(2).  
 
4.1.2 Extent of risk disclosure 
    Risk disclosure data are taken from the database of the Research Centre of 
Corporate Governance at Nankai University, which has been compiling a Corporate 
Governance Index (including a section on disclosure scores) for all A-share listed 
firms in China on a yearly basis since 2004. As in other studies, our risk disclosure 
data are restricted to those included in the annual report, based on the view that the 
annual report is the most influential disclosure document in terms of the organization 
communicating a view of its operations to the public (Neimark, 1992), and because 
the annual report is produced regularly (Gray et al., 1995).  
Under the regulatory requirements of the CSRC,
7
 the following risk categories 
are suggested as typical of Chinese listed firms: operational risks, financial risks, 
investment risks, and new products/R&D risks. A total of 18 criteria (topics and 
subtopics) form the scorecard used to assess each firm in our sample. These rules are 
broadly consistent with IFRS-converged China Accounting Standards (CAS). The 
                                                        
7
 The regulations include the following: the Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China, the 
Company Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Circular by the CSRC on the Content and Format 
Standards of Information Disclosure for Securities-Issuing Companies No.2 - Content and Format of 
Annual Report, and the Guidelines for the Corporate Governance of Listed Companies. 
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extent of risk disclosure is measured in two different ways. In our main analysis, 
firms that disclose a specific scoring criterion receive a score of one, and other firms 
receive zero. The total score for risk disclosure is computed as the equally weighted 
sum across all 18 criteria (R_DISC). Firms that disclose more risk information have 
higher scores. As a robustness check, we also use the number of sentences in the 
section on risk factors (NUM_RDISC) to measure the extent of risk disclosure. The 
list of criteria is provided in Appendix 1.  
 
4.1.3 International orientation 
    In prior studies, especially those in the international economics literature, the 
most common proxy for international orientation is the foreign sales ratio (e.g., 
foreign sales divided by total sales) (Sullivan, 1994; O’Connor et al., 2009). 
Specifically, an IOF is defined by a dummy variable (denoted INTER), which equals 
one if foreign sales are equal to or exceed 25% of total sales. In order to enhance the 
robustness of our analyses, an alternative measure of international orientation is 
defined. It is also a dummy variable (denoted INTER_D), which is coded as one if 
foreign sales are more than zero. We use INTER in the main analysis because it is well 
established in the international business literature that 25% of foreign sales is a 
benchmark for determining whether a firm has an international orientation (O’Connor 
et al., 2009; Koster and Karlsson, 2009).  
 
4.2 Model specification 
To mitigate endogeneity concerns, we adopt a lead-lag approach by regressing 
the informativeness measure for firm i in year t+1
8
 on the extent of risk disclosure 
and control variables in year t. In order to test H1, that risk disclosure is associated 
with price informativeness, we estimate the following regression equation: 
SYNCH R _ DISC SIZE LEV VOL + STDROA
51 2 3 4i,t+1 i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t
       
B / M OWNCON BIG4 DUALITY + BSIZE
76 8 9 10i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t
    
                                                        
8
 As discussed in section 4.1.1, stock price synchronicity is computed using daily returns over the 30 
trading days following the release of the risk disclosure. 
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DIND +Year+Industry+
11 i,t i,t
                              (4) 
where SYNCH is the stock price synchronicity as defined in section 4.1.1. The main 
explanatory variable is R_DISC, which was defined in section 4.1.2. If the null 
hypothesis H1 is true, then 𝛽1 should be significantly different from zero. To test H2, 
we estimate Eq. (4) for IOFs and DOFs, respectively. If H2 is true, then we should 
observe a more significant 𝛽1 for the former group.  
Following previous research (Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004; Chan and Hameed, 
2006; Gul et al., 2010), we control for a number of factors that may also affect price 
informativeness. Firm size (SIZE) is measured as the natural log of total assets in the 
year, leverage ratio (LEV) is measured as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, 
trading volume turnover (VOL) is computed as the total number of shares traded in the 
year, divided by the total number of outstanding shares in that year, earnings volatility 
(STDROA) is computed as the standard deviation of a firm’s return on assets (ROA) 
over the preceding five years, book-to-market ratio (B/M) is measured as the book 
value divided by the market value of equity in the year, ownership concentration 
(OWNCON) is defined as the Herfindahl index of the top ten shareholders of the firm, 
BIG4 is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 
auditors (i.e., PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte, Ernst & Young and KPMG) and 
otherwise equals zero, DUALITY is also a dummy variable, that equals one if the CEO 
also serves as board chairman, and otherwise equals zero, board size (BSIZE) is 
measured as the log of the number of board members, and the percentage of 
independent directors (DIND) is computed as the number of independent directors 
divided by the total number of board members. Additionally, we include year and 
industry dummies to control for industry and year fixed effects. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles to mitigate the effect of outliers. 
The variable definitions are presented in Appendix 2. 
4.3 Sample and data sources 
    Our sample covers the five-year period, 2007-2011. We start from 2007 because 
it was the first year of China’s adoption of IFRS. We restrict our sample to the 
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post-IFRS period to mitigate possible confounding effects caused by the change in 
standards. To construct the price informativeness measure, the Chinese market returns 
are extracted from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) 
database and the US stock returns from the Centre for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) database. Our risk disclosure data are obtained from the database of the 
Research Centre of Corporate Governance at Nankai University. The accounting and 
financial data used in our analyses are downloaded from the CSMAR database. 
The initial sample includes 7,035 observations. We exclude 430 dual-listed 
firm-year observations (A+B)
9
 because the value of the informativeness measure for 
such firms differs significantly from that for A-share firms (Gul et al., 2010). In 
addition, we delete 428 specially treated (ST) firm-year observations, since such firms 
are subject to many trading restrictions.
10
 We exclude another 160 financial industry 
observations, and 584 observations with insufficient accounting or financial data. The 
sample selection process yields a final sample of 5,433 observations.  
Panel A of Table 1 presents the distribution of our sample across industries based 
on CSRC industry classifications. Over 55% of the sample comes from the 
Manufacturing industry, followed by Trade (6.92%) and Real Estate (6.48%). Firms in 
the Media industry account for less than 1% of the sample. Panel B presents the 
yearly distribution of our sample. The number of firms increases monotonically over 
the five-year period, reflecting the fact that Chinese stock markets are growing 
steadily.  
[Insert Table 1] 
 
5. Empirical analysis  
                                                        
9
 In China, firms can issue A-shares, which are traded in the Chinese currency (RMB) and are mainly 
intended for domestic investors, and/or B-shares, which are traded in US dollars in Shanghai, or Hong 
Kong dollars in Shenzhen, and are mainly intended for foreign investors. Prior to 19
th
 February 2001, 
B-shares could only be purchased by foreign investors. Since then, individual domestic investors have 
also been permitted to purchase B-shares with foreign currency. 
10
 The CSRC mandates that if a listed firm reports losses in two consecutive years, its stock will be 
specially treated (ST). ST status imposes huge costs on listed firms. For instance, the daily stock price 
movement is restricted within a range of 5%. An ST firm’s semi-annual report must be audited, which 
is not required for other firms. More seriously, ST firms are not allowed to raise additional capital from 
the stock market. If an ST firm reports one further year of losses, it will be suspended from trading on 
the stock exchanges, and the stock will be delisted if a fourth annual loss is reported. 
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5.1 Summary statistics 
    Table 2 presents summary statistics on the key variables used in the full sample 
analysis (Panel A) and subsample analysis (Panel B). In Panel A, the mean and 
median of SYNCH(1) are -0.489 and -0.387, respectively, while the mean and median 
of SYNCH(2) are 0.039 and 0.076, respectively. Our measure of SYNCH(1) is 
computed using the same specification of the market model but a different sample 
period and different return data to that used in Gul et al. (2010).
11
 They report a mean 
and median of -0.232 and -0.151, which are higher than our corresponding figures. 
This suggests that, given the rapid development of the Chinese capital market, the 
informational efficiency of the stock prices of Chinese listed firms has improved 
substantially over time. Both SYNCH(1) and SYNCH(2) display considerable 
cross-sectional variations, as reflected in the high discrepancy between the minimum 
and maximum values. For example, SYNCH(1) has a minimum value of -4.430 and a 
maximum value of 1.678, with a standard deviation of 1.11. This significantly high 
variation in price synchronicity suggests that the firm-specific information flow to the 
market varies widely across firms within China. In addition, the mean and median 
values of R_DISC are 0.519 and 0.500, respectively, suggesting that the risk 
disclosure scores are evenly distributed across firms. 
Panel B presents the summary statistics for IOFs and DOFs, respectively. The 
price informativeness tends to be significantly higher among the IOFs based on both 
measures of stock price synchronicity. For example, the means of SYNCH(1) are 
-0.596 and -0.470 for the IOF and DOF subsamples, respectively. The difference 
between the two groups is significant at the 1% level. Both R_DISC and 
NUM_RDISC are significantly higher for the IOFs than the DOFs. For instance, the 
mean of R_DISC is 0.541 for the former, while it is 0.515 for the latter. The difference 
in the mean of R_DISC is significant at the 5% level between the two subsamples. 
This indicates that firms with more international business tend to disclose more risk 
factors to compensate for the uncertainty facing investors. 
                                                        
11
 Specifically, their sample period is 1996-2003. Additionally, unlike in our study where we use daily 
returns over the 30 trading days following the risk disclosure release dates, they use daily returns over 
the whole fiscal year to compute stock price synchronicity.  
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[Insert Table 2] 
 
5.2 Correlation matrix 
    Table 3 presents the Pearson correlations for the variables used in the main 
analysis. R_DISC significantly negatively correlates with both measures of 
synchronicity (coefficients: -0.060 for SYNCH(1) and -0.037 for SYNCH(2)). This 
lends initial support to the argument that risk disclosure is positively associated with 
price informativeness. Consistent with Gul et al. (2010), stock price synchronicity is 
positively correlated with firm size (SIZE), book-to-market ratio (B/M), and 
ownership concentration (OWNCEN), but negatively correlated with earnings 
volatility (STDROA). However, correlation coefficients cannot be used directly to 
establish causality due to the fact that correlations merely measure the covariation 
with which two variables move together (Chen and Metcalf, 1980). In addition, as 
R_DISC is a quantitative measure of a qualitative construct, it is difficult to interpret 
the economic significance of the correlations between R_DISC and the other variables 
(Kravet and Muslu, 2013). Finally, since the correlations among the non-dependent 
variables are less than 0.7, multicollinearity should not be a concern in this study.
12
  
[Insert Table 3] 
 
5.3 Effect of risk disclosure on stock price informativeness 
    Table 4 presents the results of Eq. (4) testing the effect of the extent of risk 
disclosure on stock price synchronicity. As seen in columns (1a) and (1b), where 
SYNCH(1) is the dependent variable, the coefficient on R_DISC is significantly 
negative (-0.156, t-stat=-3.590). This indicates that synchronicity is inversely 
associated with the extent of risk disclosure, which supports the notion that risk 
disclosure is informative and useful to investors. Thus, the amount of firm-specific 
information captured in stock prices tends to be higher when more risk factors are 
disclosed.  
                                                        
12
 Lind et al. (2002) point out that multicollinearity may exist if the correlation coefficients exceed 0.7, 
and this is a typical threshold used to identify the presence of multicollinearity. 
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Turning to the control variables, the signs of their coefficients are broadly 
consistent with prior studies. For instance, the coefficient on SIZE is positive and 
significant in column (2a) (0.111, t-stat=5.470), suggesting that the stock prices of 
large firms tend to mirror the market to a greater extent than those of small firms, 
which is partly because large firms account for a major proportion of the market index 
(Chan and Hameed, 2006; Gul et al., 2010). The coefficient on B/M is significantly 
positive (0.786, t-stat=8.820), indicating that firms with fewer growth opportunities 
tend to have less firm-specific information incorporated in their stock prices (Gul et 
al., 2010). The LEV coefficient is significantly negative (-0.545, t-stat=-6.190). This 
suggests that firms with greater financial risks tend to disclose more firm-specific 
information to satisfy the information demand of investors. The coefficient on 
STDROA is negative and significant (-1.085, t-stat=-3.530), suggesting that volatile 
earnings increase the firm-specific information incorporated in stock prices. The 
coefficients on BSIZE and DIND are negative, suggesting that superior corporate 
governance tends to enhance stock price informativeness, possibly by improving 
information transparency (Ding et al., 2013). In contrast to Gul et al. (2010), who find 
a significantly negative coefficient on VOL, our VOL coefficient is significantly 
positive (0.267, t-stat=9.350). This suggests that active trading enhances the 
incorporation of market-related information in stock prices. The above findings are 
not sensitive to the alternative measure of stock price synchronicity SYNCH(2). 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
5.4 Effect of international orientation on informativeness of risk disclosure 
    Table 5 presents the regression results from testing hypothesis H2, that the effect 
of risk disclosure on stock price synchronicity is more pronounced among IOFs. A 
firm is defined as internationally oriented if its foreign sales account for at least 25% 
of total sales (in Panel A) or if its foreign sales are greater than zero (in Panel B). To 
enhance the robustness of our analyses, the results are reported using two alternative 
measures for stock price synchronicity (SYNCH(1) and SYNCH(2)) in each panel. As 
seen in column (1), for example, the coefficients on R_DISC are -0.429 (t-stat=-3.79) 
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for IOFs and -0.095 (t-stat=-2.00) for DOFs. The difference in R_DISC is significant 
at the 1% level. This suggests that international orientation facilitates the capturing of 
firm-specific information in stock prices and thus reduces stock price synchronicity, 
which is in line with our hypothesis H2. The findings are robust to the different 
measures used for international orientation and price synchronicity, as shown in 
columns (2)-(4). 
The signs of the coefficients on the control variables are consistent with those 
reported in Table 4. In addition, these coefficients do not vary significantly between 
the two subsamples, with OWNCEN being the only exception. The coefficients on 
OWNCEN are positive and significant at the 10% level for IOFs (0.555, t-stat=1.93), 
while being negative but insignificant for DOFs (-0.093, t-stat=-0.920). This suggests 
that IOFs with a concentrated ownership structure are less likely to disclose private 
information to outside shareholders.  
[Insert Table 5] 
 
6. Robustness check and additional analysis 
6.1 Alternative measure of risk disclosure 
    Although our main proxy for risk disclosure is constructed following a rigorous 
process, some doubt can still be cast on the reliability of this measure. To provide 
robust evidence, we redo the above tests replacing R_DISC with NUM_RDISC, which 
is computed as Log (1+Number of sentences in the section on risk factors in the 
annual report). Table 6 presents the results of the regression where the dependent 
variable is SYNCH(1).
13
 As seen in Panel A, NUM_RDISC is significantly negative 
related to synchronicity for the full sample (-0.030, t-stat=-2.35). A comparison of the 
coefficient on NUM_RDISC in Panel B shows that the stock prices are less 
synchronous for IOFs (-0.148, t-stat=-4.19) than for DOFs (-0.010, t-stat=-0.70). The 
difference between the two subsamples is significant at the 1% level. Put together, 
these findings are consistent with the results reported in the main analyses, lending 
more confidence to the validity of our risk disclosure measures. 
                                                        
13
 The results (untabulated) remain qualitatively similar if SYNCH(2) is used as the dependent variable.   
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[Insert Table 6] 
 
6.2 Industry-adjusted risk disclosure 
    One may argue that there is a lack of firm-specific information in our risk 
disclosure measures (Johnson, 2010). To capture the firm-specific risk information, 
we follow Kravet and Muslu (2013) by dividing risk disclosure into industry-level 
risk disclosure, defined as the industry median of risk disclosure, and firm-specific 
risk disclosure, defined as risk disclosure net of industry-level risk disclosure (Adj. 
R_DISC). We reexamine the main tests using Adj. R_DISC as the independent 
variable. As seen in Panel A of Table 7, the coefficient on Adj. R_DISC is negative 
and significant at the 1% level, consistent with the findings reported in Table 4. Panel 
B presents the results of the subsample analysis. The coefficient on Adj. R_DISC is 
substantially lower among IOFs (-0.421, t-stat=-3.720) than DOFs (-0.102, 
t-stat=-2.180). The difference is significant at the 1% level (t-stat=-2.75). Taken 
together, the results collectively suggest that firm-specific risk disclosure is 
informative for investors, and more so for firms that are perceived to be riskier. 
[Insert Table 7] 
 
6.3 Alternative measure of informativeness: stock price crash risk 
    In this subsection, we use an alternative measure to proxy for the amount of 
firm-specific information, that is, stock price crash risk. Prior literature consistently 
suggests that managers have a self-serving bias to disclose favorable information but 
withhold unfavorable news about the firm (e.g., Kothari et al., 2009). Since risk 
disclosure is designed to convey unfavorable information and uncertainties of the firm, 
managers tend to avoid providing meaningful risk factor disclosure or even 
concealing negative news in order to protect their own wealth and jobs (Campbell et 
al., 2014). Once the unfavorable information becomes publically available, stock 
prices will inevitably drops, increasing the stock price crash risk. Thus, we expect that 
the presence of risk disclosure reduces future stock price crash risk, and especially so 
for the internationally oriented firms.  
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    Following prior literature (e.g., Kim et al., 2011a, b; Xu et al., 2014), we use two 
measures of crash risk for robustness. We first estimate firm-specific weekly returns 
(Wj,τ), measured as natural log of one plus residual returns from the following 
equation: 
𝑟𝑗,𝜏 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1,𝑗𝑟𝑚,𝜏−2 + 𝛽2,𝑗𝑟𝑚,𝜏−1 + 𝛽3,𝑗𝑟𝑚,𝜏 + 𝛽4,𝑗𝑟𝑚,𝜏+1 + 𝛽5,𝑗𝑟𝑖,𝜏+1 + 𝜀𝑗,𝜏       (5) 
where rj,τ is the return on stock j in week τ, rm,τ is the value-weighted A share market 
return.  
    Our first crash risk measure is the negative conditional skewness of firm-specific 
weekly returns (NCSKEW). We calculate NCSKEW for firm j over fiscal year t by 
taking the negative of the third moment of firm-specific weekly returns for each year 
and dividing it by the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns raised to the 
third power. The formula for the negative conditional skewness is as follows: 
𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑗,𝑡 = −[𝑛(𝑛 − 1)
3/2 ∑ 𝑊𝑗,𝜏
3 ]/[(𝑛 − 1)(𝑛 − 2)(∑ 𝑊𝑗,𝜏
2 )3/2]            (6) 
    The second measure for crash risk is down-to-up volatility (DUVOL), which is 
calculated as follows: 
DUVOLj,t = log{(nu − 1) ∑ Wj,τ
2
Down /(nd − 1) ∑ Wj,τ
2
Up }                    (7) 
    A stock with high NCSKEW or DUVOL represents a highly left-skewed return 
distribution and a high probability of price crash. Consistent with prior literature, we 
control for the following variables: stock turnover (DTURN), firm size (SIZE), 
market-to-book ratio (MB), leverage (LEV), stock return volatility (SIGMA), return on 
assets (ROA), the average firm-specific weekly returns in a year (WRET), and industry 
and year dummy variables. All the control variables are lagged one year.  
    Columns 1 and 4 of Table 8 report the results for the full sample. The 
coefficients on R_DISC are negative in both columns, despite insignificance in 
Column (1) (t-stat=-1.512). The results suggest that risk disclosure reduces future 
crash risk, consistent with our hypothesis H1. When splitting the sample into IOFs 
and DOFs, we find that the negative relation between risk disclosure and stock price 
crash risk is confined to the IOF sample, consistent with the hypothesis H2 that risk 
information is more useful to investors when the firm is perceived to be more risky. 
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[Insert Table 8] 
 
6. 4 A change specification 
    Our results may suffer from potentially correlated omitted variables and reverse 
causality issues. In an effort to address these concerns, we follow Li (2010a) and 
Kravet and Muslu (2013) by employing a change specification as follows: 
SYNCH R _ DISC SIZE LEV VOL + STDROAt t t t t5t+1 1 2 3 4
              
     B / M O W N C E N B I G 4 D U A L I T Yt t t t76 8 9
                              
             
BSIZE + DIND +Year+Industry+t t t10 11
                  (8) 
where ∆𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝐻 is the change in stock price synchronicity with SYNCH estimated 
based on Eq.(1), ∆𝑅_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶 is the change in the total risk disclosure score, ∆𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 is 
the change in firm size, ∆𝐿𝐸𝑉 is the change in the leverage ratio, ∆𝑉𝑂𝐿 is the 
change in trading volume turnover, ∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑅𝑂𝐴 is the change in earnings volatility, 
∆𝐵/𝑀 is the change in the book-to-market ratio, ∆𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑁 is the change in 
ownership concentration, ∆𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 is the change in board size, and ∆𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷 is the 
change in the percentage of independent directors. All the changes are computed on 
an annual basis.  
Table 9 presents the results of the change specification. For the full sample, as 
reported in Panel A, the coefficient on ∆𝑅_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶 is negative but insignificant (-0.056, 
t-stat=-0.940). Turning to the subsample analysis, we find that the ∆𝑅_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶 
coefficients are significantly lower among IOFs (-0.313, t-stat=-2.170) than DOFs 
(0.000, t-stat=0.000). Once again, the coefficient differs significantly between the two 
subsamples (t=-2.57). This further confirms the prediction of H2. 
[Insert Table 9] 
 
6.5 Two-stage least squares approach 
    Thus far, we have assumed that risk disclosure is exogenous to stock price 
synchronicity. However, both the level of risk disclosure and stock price synchronicity 
may depend on unobserved firm characteristics, which would in turn lead to biased 
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estimators. To further enhance the robustness of our evidence, we employ a two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) approach and repeat our main analyses. In the first stage, we 
regress R_DISC on the existent control variables along with two newly introduced 
instrumental variables (IV). The first IV we apply is CEO gender, which is a dummy 
variable taking a value of one if the CEO is female and zero otherwise. As suggested 
by Faccio et al. (2012), female CEOs display a lower propensity for risk taking, and 
are therefore expected to disclose more risk factors to mitigate uncertainty. The 
second IV is CEO age, which is a continuous variable measured as the CEO’s age as 
of the fiscal year end. Following Tasker (1998), who argues that younger CEOs are 
more likely to disclose information because they are expected to invest more in 
signaling their ability to outsiders than their counterparts who are closer to retirement, 
we expect a negative coefficient on this variable in the first-stage regression. However, 
both CEO gender and age are unlikely to have direct impacts on stock price 
synchronicity, which makes them valid IVs for 2SLS estimation. 
Table 10 presents just the second-stage results, for brevity. In the first-stage 
estimation, the untabulated results show that the coefficients on CEO gender are 
significantly positive (full sample: 0.045, t-stat=2.07), while those on CEO age are 
significantly negative (full sample: -0.003, t-stat=-4.55). A further test of the linear 
combination of the IVs suggests that the two IV estimators are efficient (F-stat=3.75, 
p-value<0.1). In the second-stage estimation, when SYNCH(1) is the dependent 
variable, R_DISC is negatively associated with stock price synchronicity (-0.159, 
t-stat=-3.66). In addition, the negative effect of risk disclosure on price synchronicity 
is more pronounced among IOFs (-0.430, t-stat=-3.86) than DOFs (-0.098, 
t-stat=-2.07). The coefficients on R_DISC differ significantly between the two 
subsamples (t-stat=-2.88). The findings are robust to the use of the alternative 
measure of stock price synchronicity (SYNCH(2)). Finally, the results of the 
Sargan-Hansen test reveal that over-identification is not a concern in the present 
study.  
[Insert Table 10] 
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6.6 Do internationally oriented firms disclose more risk factors? 
    The above findings consistently show that international orientation facilitates the 
capturing of disclosed firm-specific risk information in stock prices. The underlying 
argument is that IOFs are likely to disclose more risk factors than DOFs in order to 
mitigate the concerns of investors who are reluctant to invest in risky assets. To 
empirically investigate the argument, we estimate the model as follows: 
𝑅_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝐷𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑅_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 
+𝛼5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐵/𝑀𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑡 + 𝛼9𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑡 
     +𝛼10𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑡 + 𝛼11𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 + 𝛼12𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 + 𝛼13𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 
         +𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑡                                                 (9) 
where R_DISCt is measured as the total score for risk disclosure in year t. INTER is a 
dummy variable that equals one if foreign sales account for at least 25% of total sales. 
INTER_D is an alternative measure of international orientation, which takes a value of 
one if the firm’s foreign sales are greater than zero. If IOFs disclose more risk factors, 
then we should observe a positive and significant 𝛼1.  
Following prior literature (Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Campbell et al., 2014), we 
control for a number of factors that may also affect risk disclosure. Since a firm’s 
disclosure behavior tends to persist over time, a variable that indicates the extent of 
risk disclosure in year t-1 (R_DISCt-1) is included. Thus, the coefficient on R_DISCt-1 
will be positive. We control for firm size (SIZE) because size is considered to affect a 
firm’s reporting incentives. On the one hand, larger firms face greater public pressure 
and regulatory scrutiny (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) and will thus be more likely to 
disclose risk factors. Therefore, we would expect a positive coefficient on SIZE. On 
the other hand, however, larger firms tend to have lower risks (Fama and French, 
1993) and will thus be less likely to disclose risk factors. If this were true, we would 
expect the coefficient on SIZE to be negative. Taking these arguments together, the 
coefficient on SIZE is unknown ex ante (Campbell et al., 2014). We expect a positive 
coefficient on the leverage ratio (LEV) because heavy leverage increases firms’ 
business risk, which in turn induces firms to disclose risk information to lower the 
risk.  
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We expect the coefficient on ROA to be positive if better-performing firms have 
more financial resources for disclosing risk. However, more profitable firms may face 
less risk, which may lead to a negative coefficient on ROA. Therefore, we do not 
make a prediction about the sign of the coefficient on ROA. The coefficient on the 
book-to-market ratio (B/M) is unpredictable as well. The coefficient may be negative 
if growth opportunities are positively associated with firm risk as suggested by Fama 
and French (1993). However, if investors perceive firms with a high B/M as more 
risky, then we would expect a positive coefficient on B/M.  
Agency theory suggests that managers may voluntarily disclose information as a 
means to reduce agency conflict with the owners when shares are widely owned 
(Craswell and Taylor, 1992). However, in a dispersed ownership structure, 
shareholders are less able to influence a firm’s reporting practices (Barako et al., 
2006). Thus, the sign of the coefficient on ownership concentration (OWNCEN) 
cannot be predicted. We expect a positive coefficient on BIG4 because big four audit 
firms will require their clients to disclose more risk information due to a greater 
litigation risk (Lennox, 1999). We also expect the coefficient on DIND to be positive 
because independent directors act as an effective mechanism for curb agency 
problems (Fama and French, 1983) and thus positively affect a firm’s reporting 
practice.  
Since the market beta is typically used to measure firm risk, the coefficient on 
BETA should be positively associated with risk factor disclosure (Campbell et al., 
2014). In our study, BETA is taken from the CSMAR database. In addition, the 
coefficient on RET should be positive because the realized returns are often deemed a 
proxy for the cost of capital (Vuolteenaho, 2002). RET is measured as the annual 
stock return over the period beginning in the 5
th
 month of the fiscal year and ending in 
the 4
th
 month after fiscal year end. TURN should also be positively associated with 
risk factor disclosure because turnover is a proxy for information asymmetry (Jiang et 
al., 2005). TURN is computed using the average daily share turnover ratio during the 
fiscal year. Finally, we control for state ownership (STATE) because it increases moral 
hazard and agency problems, which in turn may discourage risk factor disclosure. 
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STATE is defined as the number of shares held by the government.  
Table 11 presents the regression results. Both measures of international 
orientation are positively associated with risk disclosure and significant at the 1% 
level, which is in line with our argument that IOFs tend to disclose more risk factors 
due to greater uncertainty. In addition, the signs of the coefficients on the control 
variables are broadly as expected, which further enhances the validity of our risk 
disclosure measures. For example, the coefficient on R_DISCt-1 is significantly 
positive, suggesting that a firm’s disclosure practices are persistent over time. The 
coefficients on BETA are significantly positive, implying that firms with greater 
business risk are likely to disclose more risk factors to mitigate uncertainty. TURN has 
positive and significant coefficients as expected, suggesting that firms with greater 
information uncertainty are more likely to disclose risk factors. STATE is negatively 
associated with risk disclosure, consistent with the notion that government ownership 
leads to greater agency conflict and subsequently a lower level of disclosure.  
 [Insert Table 11] 
 
7. Conclusions 
    In this paper we examine the association between stock price informativeness 
and the extent of risk disclosure in China. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms for 
the period 2007-2011, we obtain the following findings: First, there is a negative 
association between stock price synchronicity and risk disclosure. This is consistent 
with risk disclosure being useful and informative for investors. Furthermore, the 
association is more pronounced among IOFs, because international diversification 
increases the complexity and risk involved. As a result, such firms are likely to 
disclose more firm-specific risk factors to mitigate the concerns of investors. A further 
investigation finds that IOFs are likely to disclose more risk factors than their 
domestically oriented counterparts. Our findings are robust to alternative 
specifications and alternative measures of risk disclosure, stock price synchronicity 
and international orientation. 
Our findings have implications for policy makers, investors and firms. For policy 
 30 
makers, the increasing importance and usefulness of risk disclosure has spurred the 
stock market regulators to improve the reliability of risk information. Our empirical 
evidence largely suggests that firms tend to reveal credible information in the 
narrative sections of their annual reports. Policy makers, though, might encourage 
DOFs to exhibit more meaningful risk information in narrative sections. This is 
particularly the case given the increasing economic interdependence of national 
economies across the world, which relates to greater complexity and difficulties in 
understanding the information of multinational firms. In addition, investors can 
benefit from our study through an increased awareness of the association between 
information asymmetry and risk disclosure. Moreover, our findings may help them to 
develop more effective trading strategies. Investors might rely on our findings to form 
expectations about the informativeness of risk disclosure across DOFs and IOFs. 
Finally, firms can utilize the results to improve the information environment and 
reduce the information-asymmetric component of stock prices. Additionally, firms 
should now be aware of market expectations regarding their risk disclosure, enabling 
the market to distinguish firms that disclose meaningful risk information from those 
whose disclosure is less informative or nonexistent.  
Our study provides potential avenues for future research. First, our findings 
suggest that risk disclosure conveys firm-specific information to investors. Future 
studies can investigate whether and how risk disclosure affects the capital constraints 
or investment efficiency of public firms. Second, our study implies that international 
diversification enhances the incorporation of firm-specific risk factors into stock 
prices. Future research can examine how financial intermediaries such as analysts and 
the business press interact with risk disclosure information to affect stock price 
informativeness. Lastly, in the present study, our risk disclosure measures are limited 
to the information in annual reports. It might be worth exploring the economic 
consequences of risk factors disclosed in other documents such as press releases 
and/or conference calls.
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Table 1: Sample distribution 
Panel A: Industry distribution 
Industry  CSRC code # of firm-years % of firm-years 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing A 114 2.098 
Mining B 140 2.577 
Manufacturing C 3,028 55.733 
Utilities D 261 4.804 
Construction E 127 2.338 
Transportation F 247 4.546 
Information Technology G 313 5.761 
Trade H  376 6.921 
Real Estate J 352 6.479 
Service K 163 3.000 
Media L 46 0.847 
Others M 266 4.896 
Total  5,433 100 
Panel B: Yearly distribution 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
# of firm-years 892 943 1,001 1,287 1,310 
% of firm-years 16.418 17.357 18.424 23.689 24.112 
This table presents the sample distribution by industry (Panel A) and by year (Panel B). CSRC is the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Full sample analysis 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
SYNCH(1) -0.489 -0.387 1.110 -4.430 1.678 
SYNCH(2) 0.039 0.076 0.943 -2.580 2.125 
R_DISC 0.519 0.500 0.334 0.000 1.000 
NUM_RDISC 1.812 1.946 1.048 0.000 3.970 
INTER 0.156 0.000 0.363 0.000 1.000 
INTER_D 0.460 0.000 0.498 0.000 1.000 
SIZE 21.885 21.757 1.179 18.724 25.334 
LEV 0.509 0.518 0.187 0.078 1.262 
VOL 23.670 23.636 0.822 21.433 25.830 
STDROA 0.028 0.016 0.042 0.001 0.576 
B/M 0.634 0.620 0.260 0.094 1.231 
OWNCEN 0.362 0.345 0.153 0.085 0.750 
BIG4 0.054 0.000 0.226 0.000 1.000 
DUALITY 0.133 0.000 0.340 0.000 1.000 
BSIZE 9.205 9.000 1.850 5.000 15.000 
DIND 0.364 0.333 0.050 0.273 0.556 
Panel B: Subsample analyses 
 
Mean Median (Percentage) 
Variable 
International 
(Obs.=849) 
Domestic  
(Obs.=4,584) 
Difference 
t-stat  
International 
(Obs.=849) 
Domestic 
(Obs.=4,584)  
Difference 
t-stat 
SYNCH(1) -0.596 -0.470 3.035*** 
 
-0.475 -0.367 2.884*** 
SYNCH(2) -0.079 0.061 3.990*** 
 
-0.055 0.098 4.048*** 
R_DISC 0.541 0.515 -2.143** 
 
0.500 0.500 -1.924* 
NUM_RDISC 1.876 1.810 -1.697*  2.079 1.946 -1.923* 
SIZE 21.768 21.906 3.132*** 
 
21.655 21.786 3.384*** 
LEV 0.488 0.513 3.503*** 
 
0.497 0.523 3.363*** 
VOL 23.610 23.681 2.309** 
 
23.560 23.650 2.152** 
STDROA 0.029 0.028 -0.812 
 
0.017 0.016 -1.840* 
B/M 0.610 0.638 2.891*** 
 
0.589 0.629 2.903*** 
OWNCEN 0.358 0.363 0.937 
 
0.355 0.343 0.165 
BIG4 0.042 0.056 2.937*** 
 
0.000 0.000 2.620 
DUALITY 0.147 0.130 2.479*** 
 
0.000 0.000 1.747 
BSIZE 9.104 9.223 1.732* 
 
9.000 9.000 1.599 
DIND 0.360 0.365 2.341** 
 
0.333 0.333 3.130*** 
This table presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the full sample analyses (Panel A) and subsample analyses (Panel B). 
The variables are defined as follows: SYNCH(1) is computed as log[R
2
/(1-R
2
)], where R
2
 is estimated based on Eq. (1) using the 
daily returns of the 30 trading days following the risk disclosure release dates. SYNCH(2) is computed as log[R
2
/(1-R
2
)], where R
2
 
is estimated based on Eq. (2) using the daily returns of the 30 trading days following the risk disclosure release dates. R_DISC is 
measured as the total score for risk disclosure. NUM_RDISC is computed as Log (1+ Number of sentences in the section on risk 
factors in the annual report). SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. LEV is measured as total liabilities divided by total assets. VOL is 
defined as the total number of shares traded in a year, divided by the total number of shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year. 
STDROA is the standard deviation of a firm’s ROA over the preceding five years, including the current year. B/M is measured as 
total net assets divided by the total market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year. OWNCEN is measured as the Herfindahl 
index of the top 10 shareholders. BIG4 is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms. 
DUALITY is a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO also serves as board chair, and zero otherwise. BSIZE is measured as the 
logarithm of the number of board members. DIND is the percentage of independent directors. A firm is classified as internationally 
oriented if the foreign sales account for 25% of the total sales (e.g., O’Conner et al., 2009; Knight and Cavusgil, 2004). All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. The dummy variables are not. *, **, and *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-sided), respectively. 
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Table 3: Correlation matrix 
 
SYNCH(1) SYNCH(2) R_DISC SIZE LEV VOL STDROA B/M OWNCEN BIG4 DUALITY BSIZE DIND 
SYNCH(1) 
             
SYNCH(2) 0.852 
            
R_DISC -0.060 -0.037 
           
SIZE 0.174 0.207 -0.078 
          
LEV -0.006 0.003 -0.064 0.367 
         
VOL 0.206 0.238 0.027 0.534 0.038 
        
STDROA -0.072 -0.080 0.002 -0.152 0.017 -0.023 
       
B/M 0.099 0.067 -0.143 0.499 0.368 -0.204 -0.117 
      
OWNCEN 0.051 0.068 -0.033 0.322 0.060 0.024 -0.022 0.202 
     
BIG4 0.059 0.077 -0.033 0.355 0.039 0.152 -0.019 0.155 0.154 
    
DUALITY -0.043 -0.047 -0.009 -0.120 -0.092 -0.031 0.007 -0.112 -0.082 -0.034 
   
BSIZE 0.060 0.090 -0.038 0.288 0.115 0.159 -0.057 0.109 0.038 0.114 -0.121 
  
DIND -0.019 -0.031 -0.007 0.043 -0.017 0.042 0.001 0.009 0.034 0.039 0.034 -0.282 
 
    This table presents the Pearson correlation matrix for the variables used in the main analyses. The variables are defined as follows: SYNCH(1) is computed as log[R
2
/(1-R
2
)], 
where R
2
 is estimated based on Eq. (1) using the daily returns of the 30 trading days following the risk disclosure release dates. SYNCH(2) is computed as log[R
2
/(1-R
2
)], 
where R
2
 is estimated based on Eq. (2) using the daily returns of the 30 trading days following the risk disclosure release dates. R_DISC is measured as the total score for risk 
disclosure. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. LEV is measured as total liabilities divided by total assets. VOL is defined as the total number of shares traded in a year, 
divided by the total number of shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year. STDROA is the standard deviation of a firm’s ROA over the preceding five years, including the 
current year. B/M is measured as total net assets divided by the total market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year. OWNCEN is measured as the Herfindahl index of the 
top 10 shareholders. BIG4 is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms. DUALITY is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
CEO also serves as board chair, and zero otherwise. BSIZE is measured as the logarithm of the number of board members. DIND is the percentage of independent directors. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. The dummy variables are not. Bold numbers indicate significance at the 1% level.  
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Table 4: The effect of risk disclosure on stock price synchronicity 
 
Dependent=SYNCH(1) Dependent=SYNCH(2) 
(1a) 
Coef. 
(1b) 
t-stat 
(2a) 
Coef. 
(2b) 
t-stat 
R_DISC -0.156*** -3.590 -0.097*** -2.770 
SIZE 0.026 1.050 0.111*** 5.470 
LEV -0.545*** -6.190 -0.505*** -7.090 
VOL 0.267*** 9.350 0.146*** 6.270 
STDROA -1.085*** -3.530 -1.173*** -4.440 
B/M 0.786*** 8.820 0.391*** 5.350 
OWNCEN -0.008 -0.080 -0.024 -0.300 
BIG4 -0.073 -1.290 -0.027 -0.550 
DUALITY -0.019 -0.480 -0.010 -0.320 
BSIZE -0.013* -1.650 0.000 -0.060 
DIND -0.261 -0.970 -0.411* -1.770 
Constant -7.318*** -16.210 -5.685*** -15.520 
   
Industry dummies YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES 
N 5,433 5,433 
Adj.R
2
 0.252 0.284 
  This table presents the regression results of the effect of risk disclosure on stock price synchronicity. The variables are 
defined as follows: SYNCH(1) is computed as log[R
2
/(1-R
2
)], where R
2
 is estimated based on Eq. (1) using the daily 
returns of the 30 trading days following the risk disclosure release dates. SYNCH(2) is computed as log[R
2
/(1-R
2
)], 
where R
2
 is estimated based on Eq. (2) using the daily returns of the 30 trading days following the risk disclosure 
release dates. R_DISC is measured as the total score for risk disclosure. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. LEV is 
measured as total liabilities divided by total assets. VOL is defined as the total number of shares traded in a year, 
divided by the total number of shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year. STDROA is the standard deviation of 
a firm’s ROA over the preceding five years, including the current year. B/M is measured as total net assets divided by 
the total market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year. OWNCEN is measured as the Herfindahl index of the 
top 10 shareholders. BIG4 is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms. 
DUALITY is a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO also serves as board chair, and zero otherwise. BSIZE is 
measured as the logarithm of the number of board members. DIND is the percentage of independent directors. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. The dummy variables are not. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-sided), respectively.   
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Table 5: The association between international orientation and informativeness of risk disclosure 
 
Panel A: International=INTER Panel B: International=INTER_D 
 
(1) 
SYNCH(1) 
 (2) 
SYNCH(2) 
(3) 
SYNCH(1) 
 (4) 
SYNCH(2) 
 
International Domestic  International Domestic International Domestic  International Domestic 
R_DISC -0.429*** -0.095**  -0.200** -0.069* -0.252*** -0.09  -0.170*** -0.043 
 
(-3.790) (-2.000)  (-2.280) (-1.780) (-3.98) (-1.5)  (-3.43) (-0.87) 
 
[-2.92]***   [-1.71]*  [-2.26]**   [-1.80]*  
SIZE 0.090 0.019  0.123** 0.110*** 0.013 0.032  0.064** 0.146*** 
 
(1.260) (0.730)  (2.350) (4.960) (0.34) (1.01)  (2.04) (5.4) 
LEV -0.619*** -0.520***  -0.558*** -0.497*** -0.522*** -0.573***  -0.478*** -0.523*** 
 
(-2.770) (-5.440)  (-3.210) (-6.380) (-3.97) (-4.84)  (-4.56) (-5.33) 
VOL 0.224*** 0.277***  0.089 0.156*** 0.310*** 0.235***  0.184*** 0.114*** 
 
(2.780) (9.100)  (1.500) (6.150) (6.68) (6.47)  (5.22) (3.63) 
STDROA -2.568*** -0.823***  -1.671*** -1.054*** -1.434*** -0.782**  -1.189*** -1.154*** 
 
(-3.270) (-2.620)  (-2.580) (-3.710) (-2.66) (-2.1)  (-2.92) (-3.28) 
B/M 0.468** 0.826***  0.145 0.425*** 0.923*** 0.701***  0.499*** 0.317*** 
 
(1.970) (8.580)  (0.800) (5.300) (6.66) (5.95)  (4.61) (3.16) 
OWNCEN 0.555* -0.093  0.466* -0.102 0.101 -0.073  -0.032 -0.023 
 
(1.930) (-0.920)  (1.950) (-1.210) (0.67) (-0.59)  (-0.26) (-0.22) 
BIG4 -0.141 -0.073  0.169 -0.062 -0.098 -0.069  0.04 -0.085 
 
(-0.900) (-1.190)  (1.250) (-1.180) (-1.19) (-0.87)  (0.59) (-1.19) 
DUALITY 0.024 -0.028  0.025 -0.015 0.009 -0.055  -0.011 -0.011 
 
(0.250) (-0.630)  (0.320) (-0.410) (0.15) (-0.98)  (-0.25) (-0.23) 
BSIZE -0.038 -0.011  -0.017 0.001 -0.025** -0.006  -0.012 0.008 
 
(-1.540) (-1.360)  (-0.850) (0.170) (-2.07) (-0.55)  (-1.24) (0.97) 
DIND -1.232 -0.195  -1.135* -0.354 -0.66 -0.013  -0.572* -0.306 
 
(-1.600) (-0.680)  (-1.860) (-1.410) (-1.62) (-0.04)  (-1.72) (-0.94) 
Constant -7.014*** -7.466***  -4.246*** -5.934*** -7.933*** -6.842***  -5.421*** -5.818*** 
 
(-5.190) (-15.540)  (-4.250) (-14.990) (-11.15) (-11.42)  (-9.87) (-11.61) 
  
         
Industry YES YES  YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
Year YES YES  YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 849 4,584  849 4,584 2,498 2,935  2,498 2,935 
Adj.R
2 
0.274 0.254  0.296 0.287 0.258 0.255  0.289 0.285 
This table presents the regression results of the effect of risk disclosure on stock price synchronicity for the internationally oriented and 
domestically oriented subsamples, respectively. The variables are defined as follows: INTER is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
foreign sales account for 25% of the total sales. INTER_D is a dummy that equals one if the foreign sales are more than zero. SYNCH(1) 
is computed as log[R
2
/(1-R
2
)], where R
2
 is estimated based on Eq. (1) using the daily returns of the 30 trading days following the risk 
disclosure release dates. SYNCH(2) is computed as log[R
2
/(1-R
2
)], where R
2
 is estimated based on Eq. (2) using the daily returns of the 
30 trading days following the risk disclosure release dates. R_DISC is measured as the total score for risk disclosure. SIZE is the 
logarithm of total assets. LEV is measured as total liabilities divided by total assets. VOL is defined as the total number of shares traded 
in a year, divided by the total number of shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year. STDROA is the standard deviation of a firm’s 
ROA over the preceding five years, including the current year. B/M is measured as total net assets divided by the total market value of 
equity at the end of the fiscal year. OWNCEN is measured as the Herfindahl index of the top 10 shareholders. BIG4 is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms. DUALITY is a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO 
also serves as board chair, and zero otherwise. BSIZE is measured as the logarithm of the number of board members. DIND is the 
percentage of independent directors. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. The dummy variables are not. 
The numbers reported in parentheses are the t-statistics for the coefficients. The numbers reported in square brackets are the t-statistics 
of the difference in the coefficients on R_DISC between the two subsamples. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels (two-sided), respectively.  
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Table 6: Alternative measure of risk disclosure and stock price synchronicity 
 
Panel A: Full sample analysis Panel B: Subsample analysis 
International Domestic 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
NUM_RDISC -0.030** -2.350 -0.148*** -4.190 -0.010 -0.700 
     
[3.35]***  
SIZE 0.027 1.080 0.073 1.020 0.020 0.760 
LEV -0.542*** -6.150 -0.754*** -3.390 -0.515*** -5.390 
VOL 0.268*** 9.350 0.217 2.700 0.277*** 9.080 
STDROA -1.081*** -3.480 -2.753*** -3.490 -0.813*** -2.570 
B/M 0.811*** 9.080 0.600** 2.510 0.837*** 8.690 
OWNCEN -0.004 -0.040 0.578** 2.010 -0.094 -0.940 
BIG4 -0.062 -1.090 -0.010 -0.060 -0.070 -1.140 
DUALITY -0.014 -0.340 0.092 0.950 -0.026 -0.600 
BSIZE -0.012 -1.510 -0.024 -1.000 -0.011 -1.320 
DIND -0.229 -0.850 -0.855 -1.130 -0.185 -0.640 
Constant -7.432*** -16.500 -6.780*** -4.980 -7.536*** -15.720 
   
 
Industry dummies YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES 
N 5,433 849 4,584 
Adj.R
2
 0.251 0.276 0.253 
This table presents the regression of the effects of alternative measure of risk disclosure on stock price synchronicity 
for the full sample (Panel A) and the subsamples (Panel B). A firm is classified as internationally oriented if foreign 
sales account for 25% of total sales (e.g., O’Conner et al., 2009; Knight and Cavusgil, 2004). The dependent variable 
used in this table is SYNCH(1), computed as log[R
2
/(1-R
2
)], where R
2
 is estimated based on Eq. (1) using the daily 
returns of the 30 trading days following the risk disclosure release dates. The other variables are defined as follows: 
NUM_RDISC is computed as Log (1+ Number of sentences in the section on risk factors in the annual report). SIZE 
is the logarithm of total assets. LEV is measured as total liabilities divided by total assets. VOL is defined as the total 
number of shares traded in a year, divided by the total number of shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year. 
STDROA is the standard deviation of a firm’s ROA over the preceding five years, including the current year. B/M is 
measured as total net assets divided by the total market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year. OWNCEN is 
measured as the Herfindahl index of the top 10 shareholders. BIG4 is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is 
audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms. DUALITY is a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO also serves as 
board chair, and zero otherwise. BSIZE is measured as the logarithm of the number of board members. DIND is the 
percentage of independent directors. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. The 
dummy variables are not. The number reported in square brackets is the t-statistic of the difference in the coefficients 
on NUM_RDISC between the two subsamples. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
(two-sided), respectively. 
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Table 7: The effect of industry-adjusted risk disclosure on stock price synchronicity  
 
Panel A: Full sample analysis Panel B: Subsample analysis 
International Domestic 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Adj. R_DISC -0.162*** -3.740 -0.421*** -3.720 -0.102** -2.180 
     
[2.75]***  
SIZE 0.026 1.050 0.091 1.270 0.019 0.730 
LEV -0.544*** -6.180 -0.620*** -2.770 -0.520*** -5.430 
VOL 0.267*** 9.360 0.224*** 2.780 0.277*** 9.110 
STDROA -1.082*** -3.520 -2.562*** -3.270 -0.822*** -2.610 
B/M 0.783*** 8.800 0.465* 1.960 0.824*** 8.560 
OWNCEN -0.008 -0.080 0.561* 1.950 -0.093 -0.920 
BIG4 -0.073 -1.290 -0.145 -0.920 -0.072 -1.190 
DUALITY -0.019 -0.470 0.026 0.270 -0.027 -0.620 
BSIZE -0.013* -1.650 -0.038 -1.540 -0.011 -1.360 
DIND -0.260 -0.970 -1.230 -1.590 -0.194 -0.680 
Constant -7.413*** -16.480 -7.263*** -5.390 -7.525*** -15.720 
   
 
Industry dummies YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES 
N 5,433 849 4,584 
Adj.R
2
 0.284 0.273 0.255 
This table presents the regression of the effects of industry-adjusted risk disclosure on stock price synchronicity for the 
full sample (Panel A) and the subsamples (Panel B). A firm is classified as internationally oriented if foreign sales 
account for 25% of total sales (e.g., O’Conner et al., 2009; Knight and Cavusgil, 2004). The dependent variable used in 
this table is SYNCH(1), computed as log[R
2
/(1-R
2
)], where R
2
 is estimated based on Eq. (1) using the daily returns of 
the 30 trading days following the risk disclosure release dates. The other variables are defined as follows: Adj. R_DISC 
is measured as the firm’s total score for risk disclosure minus the industry median. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. 
LEV is measured as total liabilities divided by total assets. VOL is defined as the total number of shares traded in a year, 
divided by the total number of shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year. STDROA is the standard deviation of a 
firm’s ROA over the preceding five years, including the current year. B/M is measured as total net assets divided by the 
total market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year. OWNCEN is measured as the Herfindahl index of the top 10 
shareholders. BIG4 is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms. DUALITY 
is a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO also serves as board chair, and zero otherwise. BSIZE is measured as 
the logarithm of the number of board members. DIND is the percentage of independent directors. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. The dummy variables are not. The number reported in square 
brackets is the t-statistic of the difference in the coefficients on Adj. R_DISC between the two subsamples. *, **, and 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-sided), respectively. 
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Table 8: The effect of risk disclosure on future stock price crash risk 
 NCSKEW  DUVOL 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Full sample International  Domestic   Full sample International  Domestic  
R_DISC -0.051 -0.242*** -0.014  -0.050* -0.198*** -0.019 
 (-1.512) (-2.851) (-0.393)  (-1.887) (-3.001) (-0.661) 
  [-2.46]**   [-2.52]** 
DTURN -0.072* -0.017 -0.079*  -0.045 -0.000 -0.050 
 (-1.805) (-0.179) (-1.765)  (-1.390) (-0.002) (-1.391) 
WRET 2.736*** 4.165** 2.395***  1.693*** 3.809** 1.401** 
 (3.687) (2.436) (2.922)  (2.836) (2.344) (2.118) 
M/B 0.092*** 0.130*** 0.088***  0.064*** 0.087*** 0.062*** 
 (7.137) (3.669) (6.402)  (6.184) (3.199) (5.584) 
SIZE 0.089*** 0.115*** 0.082***  0.072*** 0.092*** 0.067*** 
 (6.734) (3.417) (5.904)  (6.600) (3.325) (5.757) 
SIGMA 19.864*** 27.828*** 17.879***  13.594*** 21.582*** 11.890*** 
 (4.689) (2.686) (3.863)  (4.026) (2.752) (3.214) 
LEV -0.058 -0.248 -0.004  -0.103* -0.197 -0.072 
 (-0.791) (-1.488) (-0.051)  (-1.810) (-1.453) (-1.143) 
ROA 0.383* 0.319 0.357  -0.130 -0.061 -0.180 
 (1.777) (0.607) (1.499)  (-0.752) (-0.139) (-0.947) 
Constant -3.009*** -3.510*** -2.886***  -2.181*** -2.606*** -2.074*** 
 (-9.184) (-4.343) (-8.235)  (-8.050) (-4.164) (-7.059) 
Industry dummies YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
N 5,297 822 4,475  5,297 822 4,475 
Adj.R
2 
0.103 0.143 0.099  0.127 0.178 0.120 
This table presents the regression of the effects of risk disclosure on stock price crash risk. A firm is classified as 
internationally oriented if foreign sales account for 25% of total sales (e.g., O’Conner et al., 2009; Knight and 
Cavusgil, 2004). The dependent variables used in this table are the negative conditional skewness of firm-specific 
weekly returns (NCSKEW) and down-to-up volatility (DUVOL). The other variables are defined as follows: 
R_DISC is measured as the total score for risk disclosure. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. LEV is measured 
as total liabilities divided by total assets. ROA is return on assets. M/B is measured as the total market value of 
equity divided by total net assets at the end of the fiscal year. WRET is the average firm-specific weekly returns in 
fiscal year t – 1. DTURN is stock turnover. SIGMA is stock return volatility. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. The dummy variables are not. The number reported in square brackets is 
the t-statistic of the difference in the coefficients on R_DISC between the two subsamples. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-sided), respectively.
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Table 9: The effect of risk disclosure on stock price synchronicity using change models 
 
Panel A: Full sample analysis Panel B: Subsample analysis 
International Domestic 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
∆R_DISC -0.056 -0.940 -0.313** -2.170 0.000 0.000 
     
[2.57]***  
∆SIZE 0.204** 2.240 0.684*** 2.620 0.128 1.330 
∆LEV -0.453* -1.830 -1.622** -2.300 -0.246 -0.940 
∆VOL 0.444*** 10.400 0.444*** 4.000 0.452*** 9.710 
∆STDROA -0.154 -0.210 -5.525*** -3.320 0.665 0.840 
∆B/M 0.198 1.240 0.083 0.190 0.189 1.100 
∆OWNCEN 0.552 1.040 -0.428 -0.280 0.793 1.420 
BIG4 0.055 0.700 -0.331 -1.500 0.096 1.150 
DUALITY 0.052 0.890 0.006 0.040 0.056 0.880 
∆BSIZE 0.003 0.100 -0.131 -1.570 0.016 0.540 
∆DIND 0.038 0.060 -4.895*** -2.720 0.651 0.950 
Constant 0.443*** 4.580 0.543** 2.310 0.444*** 4.170 
   
 
Industry dummies YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES 
N 4,049 627 3,422 
Adj.R
2
 0.153 0.179 0.159 
This table presents the regression of the effect of risk disclosure on stock price synchronicity using change models for 
the full sample (Panel A) and the subsamples (Panel B). A firm is classified as internationally oriented if foreign sales 
account for 25% of total sales (e.g., O’Conner et al., 2009; Knight and Cavusgil, 2004). The dependent variable used in 
this table is ∆SYNCH(1), measured as the annual change in stock price synchronicity. The other variables are defined as 
follows: ∆R_DISC is measured as the annual change in the total score for risk disclosure. ∆SIZE is the annual change in 
firm size, measured as the logarithm of total assets. ∆LEV is the annual change in leverage, measured as total liabilities 
divided by total assets. ∆VOL is the annual change in trading volume turnover, defined as the total number of shares 
traded in a year, divided by the total number of shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year. ∆STDROA is the annual 
change in earnings volatility, measured as the standard deviation of a firm’s ROA over the preceding five years, 
including the current year. ∆B/M is the annual change in the book-to-market ratio, measured as total net assets divided 
by the total market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year. ∆OWNCEN is the annual change in ownership 
concentration, measured as the Herfindahl index of the top 10 shareholders. BIG4 is a dummy variable that equals one if 
the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms. DUALITY is a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO also 
serves as board chair, and zero otherwise. ∆BSIZE is the annual change in board size, measured as the logarithm of the 
number of board members. ∆DIND is the annual change in the percentage of independent directors. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. The dummy variables are not. The number reported in square 
brackets is the t-statistic of the difference in the coefficients on ∆R_DISC between the two subsamples. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-sided), respectively.   
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Table 10: The effect of risk disclosure on stock price synchronicity using the 2SLS approach 
 
Dependent=SYNCH(1) Dependent=SYNCH(2) 
Full sample International Domestic Full sample International Domestic 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
R_DISC -0.159*** -3.660 -0.430*** -3.860 -0.098** -2.070 -0.099*** -2.810 -0.203** -2.350 -0.070* -1.820 
     
[2.88]***      [1.70]*  
SIZE 0.026 1.050 0.091 1.290 0.019 0.720 0.109*** 5.360 0.122** 2.370 0.108*** 4.850 
LEV -0.538*** -6.110 -0.623*** -2.830 -0.512*** -5.340 -0.499*** -6.990 -0.562*** -3.270 -0.488*** -6.270 
VOL 0.266*** 9.300 0.226*** 2.850 0.275*** 9.040 0.148*** 6.370 0.091 1.560 0.158*** 6.240 
STDROA -1.084*** -3.540 -2.541*** -3.290 -0.829*** -2.640 -1.172*** -4.450 -1.644*** -2.590 -1.058*** -3.740 
B/M 0.780*** 8.760 0.482** 2.040 0.818*** 8.510 0.392*** 5.370 0.166 0.920 0.422*** 5.290 
OWNCEN 0.009 0.090 0.567** 2.000 -0.075 -0.740 -0.008 -0.100 0.487** 2.060 -0.087 -1.020 
BIG4 -0.074 -1.310 -0.147 -0.940 -0.074 -1.210 -0.027 -0.550 0.163 1.230 -0.061 -1.160 
DUALITY -0.017 -0.440 0.019 0.210 -0.025 -0.560 -0.010 -0.310 0.017 0.230 -0.013 -0.360 
BSIZE -0.013 -1.630 -0.038 -1.580 -0.011 -1.340 0.000 -0.010 -0.018 -0.890 0.002 0.230 
DIND -0.249 -0.930 -1.219 -1.600 -0.183 -0.640 -0.399* -1.720 -1.134* -1.890 -0.340 -1.350 
Constant -7.310*** -16.190 -7.085*** -5.290 -7.442*** -15.500 -5.707*** -15.570 -4.296*** -4.350 -5.949*** -15.020 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 5,410 845 4,565 5,410 845 4,565 
Centered R
2
 0.252 0.274 0.254 0.284 0.297 0.287 
Sargan-Hansen test 
(p-value) 
(2.527) (4.558) (0.881) (1.909) (1.074) (3.110) 
This table presents the second-stage results of the two-stage least squares regressions. The instrumental variables used in the first stage are CEO gender and CEO age. CEO gender is a dummy 
variable taking a value of one for female CEOs. CEO age is measured as the age of the CEO as of fiscal year end. A firm is classified as internationally oriented if foreign sales account for 25% 
of total sales (e.g., O’Conner et al., 2009; Knight and Cavusgil, 2004). The variables are defined as follows: SYNCH(1) is computed as log[R2/(1-R2)], where R2 is estimated based on Eq. (1) 
using the daily returns of the 30 trading days following the risk disclosure release dates. SYNCH(2) is computed as log[R
2
/(1-R
2
)], where R
2
 is estimated based on Eq. (2) using the daily 
returns of the 30 trading days following the risk disclosure release dates. R_DISC is measured as the total score for risk disclosure. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. LEV is measured as 
total liabilities divided by total assets. VOL is defined as the total number of shares traded in a year, divided by the total number of shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year. STDROA is 
the standard deviation of a firm’s ROA over the preceding five years, including the current year. B/M is measured as total net assets divided by the total market value of equity at the end of the 
fiscal year. OWNCEN is measured as the Herfindahl index of the top 10 shareholders. BIG4 is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms. 
DUALITY is a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO also serves as board chair, and zero otherwise. BSIZE is measured as the logarithm of the number of board members. DIND is the 
percentage of independent directors. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. The dummy variables are not. The numbers reported in square brackets are the 
t-statistics of the differences in the coefficients on R_DISC between the two subsamples. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-sided), respectively.  
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Table 11: Do internationally oriented firms disclose more risk information? 
 
Dependent= R_DISCt 
 
Expected signs Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
INTER + 0.064*** 4.650 
  
INTER_D + 
  
0.053*** 5.160 
R_DISCt-1 + 0.404*** 25.840 0.402*** 25.700 
SIZE ? 0.004 0.580 0.001 0.100 
LEV + -0.016 -0.500 -0.021 -0.650 
ROA ? -0.021 -0.230 -0.025 -0.280 
B/M ? -0.077*** -2.780 -0.077*** -2.790 
OWNCEN ? 0.033 0.990 0.036 1.080 
BIG4 + 0.015 0.670 0.011 0.480 
DIND + 0.030 0.320 0.034 0.370 
BETA + 0.059** 2.160 0.054** 1.970 
RET + 0.165 0.740 0.134 0.600 
TURN + 0.008** 2.010 0.008** 2.000 
STATE - -0.065** -2.310 -0.068** -2.420 
Constant ? 0.187 1.470 0.251** 1.970 
Industry dummies  YES YES 
Year dummies  YES YES 
N  4118 4118 
Adj.R
2
  0.192 0.193 
This table presents the regression investigating whether internationally oriented firms disclosed more risk information. The variables are 
defined as follows: R_DISC is measured as the total score for risk disclosure. INTER is a dummy variable that equals one if foreign sales 
account for 25% of total sales, and zero otherwise. INTER_D is an alternative measure of international orientation, which equals one if 
there is the firm has any foreign sales and zero otherwise. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. LEV is measured as total liabilities divided 
by total assets. ROA is measured as net income divided by total assets. B/M is measured as total net assets divided by the total market value 
of equity at the end of the fiscal year. OWNCEN is measured as the Herfindahl index of the top 10 shareholders. BIG4 is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms. DIND is the percentage of independent directors. BETA is a measure 
for firm risk obtained from the CSMAR database. RET is the annual stock return beginning in the 5
th
 month of the fiscal year and ending in 
the 4
th
 month after fiscal year end. TURN is the average daily share turnover ratio during the fiscal year. STATE is the number of shares held 
by the government. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The dummy variables are not. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-sided), respectively. 
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Appendix 1: Scoring method for risk disclosure 
Disclosure content Scoring 
Operational risks  
Potential difficulties in achieving the company’s strategic objectives? 1 if yes, 0 if no 
Measures for dealing with difficulties in achieving the company’s strategic objectives? 1 if yes, 0 if no 
Potential difficulties in achieving the company’s business objectives? 1 if yes, 0 if no 
Measures for dealing with difficulties in achieving the company’s business objectives? 1 if yes, 0 if no 
Unfavorable factors caused by industry competition? 1 if yes, 0 if no 
Measures to counter the unfavorable factors caused by industry competition? 1 if yes, 0 if no 
Competitive disadvantages or weaknesses? 1 if yes, 0 if no 
Measures to counter competitive disadvantages or weaknesses? 1 if yes, 0 if no 
Investment risks  
Difficulties encountered in the company’s current investment projects? 1 if yes, 0 if no 
Measures for dealing with difficulties encountered in the company’s current investment 
projects? 
1 if yes, 0 if no 
Difficulties related to the company’s planned new investment projects? 1 if yes, 0 if no 
Measures for dealing with difficulties related to the company’s planned new investment 
projects? 
1 if yes, 0 if no 
Financial risks  
Difficulties associated with financing (e.g., interest rate, exchange rate, liquidity, credit, 
mergers & acquisitions and so forth) 
1 if yes, 0 if no 
Measures for dealing with financial risks? 1 if yes, 0 if no 
New product/R&D risks  
Difficulties related to the company’s planned new products or services? 1 if yes, 0 if no 
Measures for dealing with difficulties related to the company’s planned new products or 
services? 
1 if yes, 0 if no 
Potential difficulties associated with the company’s R&D projects? 1 if yes, 0 if no 
Measures for dealing with the potential difficulties associated with the company’s R&D 
projects? 
1 if yes, 0 if no 
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Appendix 2: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
R
2
 R
2
 of either of the market models calculated using the daily returns of the 30 trading days 
following the risk disclosure release dates. 
SYNCH(1)  Ln[R
2
/(1-R
2
)], where R
2
 is estimated based on Eq. (1). 
SYNCH(2)  Ln[R
2
/(1-R
2
)], where R
2
 is estimated based on Eq. (2). 
NCSKEW The negative coefficient of skewness, calculated by taking the negative of the third moment 
of firm-specific weekly returns for each sample year and dividing it by the standard 
deviation of firm-specific weekly returns raised to the third power. See Eq. (6) for details. 
DUVOL For each firm j over year t, we separate firm-specific weekly returns into down (up) weeks 
when the weekly returns are below (above) the annual mean. We separately calculate the 
standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns for each of the two groups. Then, 
DUVOL is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the standard deviation in the down weeks to 
the standard deviation in the up weeks. See Eq. (7) for details. 
R_DISC 
NUM_RDISC 
Total score for risk disclosure. Please see Appendix 1 for details. 
Log (1+Number of sentences in the section on risk factors in the annual report). 
INTER A dummy variable that equals one if foreign sales account for 25% of total sales, and zero 
otherwise. 
INTER_D A dummy variable that equals one if foreign sales are greater than zero, and zero otherwise 
SIZE The logarithm of total assets at the end of the fiscal year. 
LEV Leverage ratio computed as total liabilities divided by total assets. 
VOL Trading volume turnover, computed as the total number of shares traded in a year divided 
by the total number of shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year. 
STDROA Earnings volatility, computed as the standard deviation of a firm’s ROA over the preceding 
five years, including the current year. 
B/M Book-to-market ratio, defined as total net assets divided by the total market value of equity 
at the end of the fiscal year. 
OWNCON Ownership concentration, measured as the Herfindahl index of the top 10 shareholders. 
BIG4 Dummy variable that equals one if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 auditors. 
DUALITY Dummy variable that equals one if the CEO also serves as board chairman, and zero 
otherwise. 
BSIZE Board size, measured as the log of the number of board members. 
DIND Percentage of independent directors, defined as the number of independent directors 
divided by the total number of board members. 
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BETA A measure for firm risk taken from the CSMAR database. 
RET Annual stock return beginning in the 5th month of the fiscal year and ending in the 4th 
month after fiscal year end. 
TURN The average daily share turnover ratio during the fiscal year. 
STATE The number of shares held by the government. 
DTURN The average monthly share turnover for the current fiscal year minus the average monthly 
share turnover for the previous fiscal year, where monthly share turnover is the monthly 
trading volume divided by the total number of floating shares on the market that month. 
SIGMA The standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year. 
ROA The income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. 
WRET The average firm-specific weekly returns. 
 
